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Narrowing Successorship: The Alter Ego Doctrine
and the Role of Intent
Drew Willis & Richard A. Bales
ABSTRACT
When one company is acquired by another in a bona fide transac-
tion, the successor employer generally is not bound by the substan-
tive provisions of a collective bargaining contract negotiated by its
predecessor. When, however, a company merely changes its name
or corporate form, courts will use the alter ego doctrine to hold the
company to its labor obligations. Courts are split regarding the role
intent should play in distinguishing successor companies from alter
ego companies. Our Article argues that courts should be able to
infer invidious intent from anti-union animus, from the employer's
receiving a foreseeable benefit by eliminating its collective bargain-
ing obligations, or from the employer's desire to avoid its collective
bargaining obligations, even if the employer was motivated by other
factors, as well.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both the labor organization and the employer, as signatories to a
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), obligate themselves to ad-
here to its terms, which are the product of their collective bargaining. 2
However, a party that was a non-signatory can become bound to the
CBA, entered into by its predecessor, if it is deemed to be the "alter
ego" of the previous employer.3
The alter ego doctrine was developed to prevent employers from
evading obligations under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") merely by changing or altering their corporate form.4 It
focuses on whether one business entity should be held to the labor
obligations of another business entity that has discontinued opera-
tions.5 The alter ego doctrine is most commonly used in labor cases to
bind a new employer that continues the operations of an old employer
where the new employer is "merely a disguised continuance of the old
employer."6
A successor employer, as opposed to an alter ego employer, arises
only when there is "a bona fide purchase or sale, meaning an arm's
length relinquishment of control between two independent entities."7
In contrast to an alter ego employer, a successor employer is not
bound by the substantive provisions of a CBA negotiated by its prede-
cessor but not agreed to or assumed by it.8 Therefore, although an
alter ego employer is considered the successor, it is important to dis-
tinguish the two in determining what "successor" employers are
bound by a CBA.
In determining whether a successor employer is the alter ego of its
predecessor, the courts generally agree that that the first step is to
determine "whether the two enterprises have substantially identical
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, su-
pervision, and ownership" (the Crawford Door factors). 9 However,
none of these factors, taken alone, is the sine qua non of a finding of
2. See 20 WILLISTON ON CONTRAcrs 55:19 (4th ed. 2009) (citing In re Hillsboro-Deering Sch.
Dist., 737 A.2d 1098 (1999)).
3. See, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1983).
4. See NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579 (6th Cir. 1986).
5. See Iowa Express Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Bar-
gaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations, supra note 1, at 638).
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1990)
(citing Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942)); see also Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 259 (1974).
7. Gary Alan MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1035.
8. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 273 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 579 (citing Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 NLRB
1144 (1976)).
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alter ego status.10 Although the Crawford Door factors are generally
applied in alter ego cases, the circuits are split three ways on what
weight an employer's intent in forming a new entity should be given in
determining whether that company is the alter ego." One group of
circuits adopts the "necessary" approach, where a finding of unlawful
motive or intent is critical in an alter ego analysis.12 Another group of
circuits adopts an "important" approach, where the courts look only
at intent to evade union responsibilities as one of the relevant factors
that must be considered in an alter ego analysis.13 Finally, the Fourth
Circuit adheres to a "foreseeable" approach, where the court will look
at whether the employer obtained a reasonably foreseeable benefit by
opening a separate entity.14
This Article argues that the circuits should adopt a modified "fore-
seeable" approach in determining whether a successor employer is the
alter ego of its predecessor and is therefore bound by the predecessor
CBA. Part II of this Article will further examine the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315
U.S. 100 (1942), and its relevance to the alter ego test. Part III will
examine the "necessary," "important," and "foreseeable" approaches,
taken by the different circuits in an alter ego analysis. Part IV will
analyze each of these approaches.
Part V will argue that the modified "foreseeable" approach is the
best option for two reasons. First, it provides the best guidance on
how intent should be applied in an alter ego analysis. Second, it is the
most consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent as set forth in
Southport Petroleum.
II. BACKGROUND: SOUTHPORT PETROLEUM
To deal with cases involving a reorganization of an employer, the
National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") developed its alter ego
doctrine, which was first recognized by the Supreme Court in South-
port Petroleum.'5 Southport Petroleum was also the last pronounce-
ment of the Court on the alter ego doctrine.16 Southport Petroleum
10. See, e.g., Fugazy Cont'l Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
11. See, e.g., Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that although the
Court in Southport Petroleum indicated that "a disguise intended to evade" the labor laws was a
sufficient condition to impose alter ego status, it did not decide whether such an intent was
necessary to that determination).
12. See, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1983).
13. See, e.g., Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 1994).
14. See, e.g., Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1021.
15. See Gary Alan MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1029.
16. Id.
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was a Texas corporation that had engaged in various unfair labor prac-
tices and was ordered by the Board to cease and desist from these
practices and to reinstate three employees found to have been dis-
criminatorily discharged.' 7 Southport was further ordered to pay these
employees back pay for the period from the time of discharge to the
date of the offer of reinstatement.' 8
Southport entered into a written stipulation with the Board that it
would obey the order except as it related to back pay, and the Board
stipulated that it would accept the performance promised as sufficient
compliance with its order.19 However, Southport failed to live up to
its promise with the Board, and therefore the Board filed a petition
with the Fifth Circuit for enforcement of its order.20
Soon after the Board filed its petition, Southport filed an applica-
tion under the NLRA to adduce additional evidence before the
Board.21 The application stated that three days after Southport exe-
cuted the stipulation of obedience to the Board's order, it distributed
all of its assets to its four shareholders as a liquidating dividend.22 The
application further stated that the shareholders conveyed Southport
to a newly organized Delaware corporation whose shareholders were
at no time shareholders of Southport.23 Southport therefore asked the
Fifth Circuit to order that these facts be taken before the Board and
that the court dismiss the enforcement proceedings.24 The Fifth Cir-
cuit sustained the Board's order based upon Texas law and denied the
motion to dismiss and application for leave to adduce additional evi-
dence.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the ques-
tion of whether the court of appeals erred in denying Southport's
application for leave to adduce additional evidence that it had
dissolved.26
17. Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 101-02 (1942)
18. Id. at 102.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 103.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See NLRB v. Southport Petroleum Co., 117 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 100
(1942) ("[Southport] has filed ... for leave to adduce additional evidence to the effect that,
subsequent to the entry of the order by the Board, it disposed of all of its assets, and was dis-
solved. [Southport] is a Texas corporation. Under the laws of that state the corporation, upon
dissolution, is continued in existence for a period of three years for the purpose of suing and
being sued. Conceding that the dissolution has taken place, it can have no effect upon this
proceeding."). Id.
26. See Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 104 (1942).
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In affirming the Board's order, the Supreme Court stated what
would become the test for determining alter ego status. The test laid
out by the court in Southport Petroleum is "[w]hether there was a
bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership . . . or
merely a disguised continuance of the old employer . "27 The court
went on to say that "[the] operation might have continued under the
old business form or under a disguise intended to evade this provi-
sion.28 If there was merely a change in name or in apparent control
there is no reason to grant the petitioner relief . . . , instead there is
added ground for compelling obedience." 29 The Supreme Court held
that it did not clearly appear in this case whether there was a true
change of ownership, and it therefore remanded the case to the Board
for a determination.30 Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson further
stated that "[t]he additional evidence was immaterial for the further
reason that the Board's order ran not only to the petitioner, but also
to its 'officers, agents, successor, and assigns.'"31 Therefore, the nar-
row holding in Southport Petroleum was that leave to adduce addi-
tional evidence pursuant to Section 10(e) of the NLRA is denied
when this evidence is not material. 32
III. THE "NECESSARY," "IMPORTANT," AND
"FORESEEABLE" APPROACHES
The circuits are split three ways regarding what role an employer's
motive should play in finding a successor employer to be the alter ego
of its predecessor. The United States Courts of Appeal for the First,
Seventh, and Eights Circuits have adopted the "necessary" ap-
proach. 33 In determining whether a successor employer is the alter
ego, these circuits state that a finding of intent to evade union obliga-
27. Id. at 106.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106.
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating
"[u]nlawful motive or intent are critical inquiries in an alter ego analysis . . . ."); Trs. of the
Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995
F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating "[w]hat is essential for the application of the alter ego
doctrine, though, is a finding of 'the existence of a disguised continuance of a former business
entity or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective bargaining agreement, such as
through a sham transfer of assets. In sum, unlawful motive or intent are critical inquiries in an
alter ego analysis . . . .' Therefore, the district court correctly found that the unlawful motive or
intent necessary for the application of the alter ego doctrine was not present during this pe-
riod."); Iowa Express Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating "for an
alter ego finding * * * the employer must act from anti-union animus").
2010] 155
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tions is necessary in an alter ego analysis. 34 The approach taken by the
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Circuits, is the "important" approach.35 This approach states that al-
though intent to thwart a Board order or statutory requirement is an
important criteria, a showing of employer intent is not required in an
alter ego analysis.36 Under the "foreseeable" approach, the Fourth
Circuit looks to whether the successor employer gained a "foreseeable
benefit," rather than intent to evade labor obligations.37
A. The "Necessary" Approach
The First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits adhere to the "necessary"
approach, in which a finding of intent to evade union obligations is
necessary to find the successor company the alter ego.38 For example,
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Goodman Piping Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
"[t]he argument that the Board must find ... an intent to evade union obligations before it can
impose alter ego status is unpersuasive."); Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that a finding of intent is not critical in an alter ego analysis but is only one factor
that should be considered); J. Vallery Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 2003)
(stating "[w]hether two companies are alter egos is a question of fact answered through two
inquiries. First, the Board must determine 'whether the two enterprises have substantially iden-
tical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and owner-
ship.' Second, it must gauge whether there was an unlawful motive behind the creation of the
new business entity, determining whether there was a 'disguised continuance' or 'attempt to
avoid the obligations of [an existing] collective bargaining agreement through a sham transaction
or technical change in operations.'"); NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir.
1986) (concluding that a finding of employer intent is not essential or prerequisite to the imposi-
tion of alter ego status); Haley & Haley, Inc. v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating "the determination that one entity is merely another's alter ego will depend to some
extent on whether or not the transfer of assets or the dissolution of the old entity is motivated by
union animus."); NLRB v. Tricor Prods., Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating "evi-
dence of anti-union sentiment by an employer, occurring either before or after the change in the
structure of the business, is germane."); Fugazy Cont'l Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (stating "the Board will give substantial weight to evidence that the motive for the
transaction was to evade statutory and contractual duties under the NLRA or to escape the
reach of the Board's remedies.").
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983). "A similar analysis is appro-
priate in determining whether alter ego status should be imposed. When business operations are
transferred, the initial question is whether substantially the same entity controls both the old and
new employer. If this control exists, then the inquiry must turn to whether the transfer resulted
in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination
of its labor obligations." Id.
38. See, e.g., Penntech Papers, 706 F.2d at 24 (stating "[u]nlawful motive or intent are critical
inquiries in an alter ego analysis . . . ."); Favia Elec., 995 F.2d at 789 (stating "[w]hat is essential
for the application of the alter ego doctrine, though, is a finding of 'the existence of a disguised
continuance of a former business entity or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective
bargaining agreement, such as through a sham transfer of assets. In sum, unlawful motive or
intent are critical inquiries in an alter ego analysis . . . .' Therefore, the district court correctly
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in 1993, the Seventh Circuit decided Trustees of the Pension, Welfare
and Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec-
tric Company, Inc, in which the court determined that Favia Electric,
a/k/aT & M Electric, did not have the requisite intent to be deter-
mined the alter ego.39
In 1982, Thomas Miniscalco ("Thomas") started doing business as
Tom's Electric, a non-union sole proprietorship.40 During the next two
years, Thomas repeatedly used the name of Favia Electric, because
Favia Electric had a contractor's license and Thomas did not, and
Favia Electric no longer performed electrical work.41 In 1984, Thomas
and his wife, Mary Ann, hoping that the use of the name "Favia Elec-
tric" would bring them additional business, entered into a licensing
agreement with Favia, the sole owner of Favia Electric, for the use of
Favia Electric's corporate name.42 At the same time the licensing
agreement was executed, Mary Ann was elected president and sole
director of Favia Electric.43
Although both Favia Electric and Tom's Electric employed the
same two individuals, Thomas and George Anderson, the two busi-
nesses kept separate books, bank accounts, and equipment.44 Further,
Favia Electric and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers ("IBEW") had a CBA in which Favia Electric was obligated to
contribute to the pension fund, thus, pension contributions were made
on work Thomas performed as Favia Electric; Tom's Electric never
entered into a CBA with IBEW and did not make pension contribu-
tions. 45 Thomas testified that the use of the Favia Electric name dur-
ing the licensing agreement did not bring in any additional customers,
consequently, Thomas terminated the licensing agreement with Favia
Electric in 1985.46 Upon terminating the licensing agreement, Mary
Ann resigned as president of Favia Electric, and Thomas also ceased
doing business as Tom's Electric. 47 The day after terminating the li-
censing agreement and ceasing to do business as Tom's Electric,
found that the unlawful motive or intent necessary for the application of the alter ego doctrine
was not present during this period."); Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1311 (stating "for an alter ego
finding * * * the employer must act from anti-union animus").
39. See Favia Elec., 995 F.2d at 789.
40. Id. at 786.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Favia Elec., 995 F.2d at 786.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 787.
47. Id.
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Thomas and Mary Ann started T & M Electric.4 8 T & M Electric
thereafter began performing work for thirty-nine customers, thirty of
which were new and nine of which had been previously employed by
Favia Electric. 49
IBEW sued Favia Electric a/k/aT & M Electric, and Thomas and
Mary Ann individually to establish liability for contributions to the
pension fund.50 The district court entered judgment in favor of T & M
Electric and Thomas and Mary Ann, and IBEW appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit.5 1 In its analysis of whether T & M Electric and Thomas
and Mary Ann should be held liable for pension contributions under
the alter ego doctrine, the Seventh Circuit began by acknowledging
that the finding of the existence of a disguised continuance of a former
business entity or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a CBA, such
as through a sham transfer of assets, is essential for an application of
the alter ego doctrine.5 2 The court continued by stating that, "[i]n
sum, unlawful motive or intent are critical inquires in an alter ego
analysis."53
In determining whether the defendants were the alter ego of Favia
Electric, the Seventh Circuit examined two periods of time. 5 4 The
Seventh Circuit looked at the time when Tom's Electric and Favia
Electric were operating under the licensing agreement, and also when
Thomas and Mary Ann were operating as T & M Electric.5 5 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that, during the course of the licensing agreement,
Thomas and Mary Ann were seeking to improve their business pros-
pects through the use of the Favia Electric name,56 and because new
customers were obtained for Favia Electric by Thomas while the li-
censing agreement was in effect, Thomas and Mary Ann were not try-
ing to evade union obligations but were making pension contributions
that otherwise would not have been made.57 Further, when looking at
the time when Thomas and Mary Ann were operating T & M Electric,
the Seventh Circuit stated that, because the decision to terminate the
licensing agreement was motivated by valid business concerns and not
48. Id.
49. Favia Elec., 995 F.2d at 787.
50. Id. at 786.
51. Id.
52. Id, at 789.
53. Id. (quoting Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs. v. Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d 1309, 1312
(7th Cir. 1987)).
54. Favia Elec., 995 F.2d at 787.
55. Id. at 788.
56. Id. at 789.
57. Id
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an intent to avoid union obligations, T & M was not the alter ego of
Favia.58
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that
the unlawful motive or intent necessary for the application of the alter
ego doctrine was not present during either period.59 The Seventh Cir-
cuit based its holding on the lack of a benefit received by Thomas and
Mary Ann from the use of the Favia Electric name. 60 The Seventh
Circuit held that valid business reasons existed for Thomas and Mary
Ann to create the new employer.61 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Tom's Elec-
tric and Thomas and Mary Ann.6 2 The alter ego test set forth by the
Seventh Circuit is also followed by the First and Eighth Circuits.63
B. The "Important" Approach
The majority of circuits have adopted the "important" approach,
holding that while intent is a relevant factor to consider, a finding of
anti-union motivation is not necessary. 64 For example, in 1986, the
Sixth Circuit decided NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc, in which the
court determined that Ward Moving was the alter ego of A.E. Ward,
without a determination of the defendant's intent.65
In Allcoast, Robert Harris was the president, chief operating officer,
and owner of A.E. Ward. 66 A.E. Ward was a trucking company that
transported goods three ways: 1) under the authority of its own license
issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"); 2) under the
authority of its own license issued by the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio; and 3) as an agent for Atlas Van Lines, Inc. ("Atlas"), under
the authority of an ICC license issued in Atlas's name. 67 All truck
drivers employed by A.E. Ward, regardless of whether they per-
formed Atlas business or independent business, were represented by
Local 392.68
58. Id.
59. Favia Elec., 995 F.2d at 789.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding
"[u]nlawful motive or intent are critical inquiries in an alter ego analysis .... ). See also, e.g.,
Iowa Express Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating "for an alter
ego finding * * * the employer must act from anti-union animus").
64. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 583.
66. Id. at 577.
67. Id.
68. Id.
2010] 159
160 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
In 1982, Atlas adopted a new policy prohibiting companies acting as
Atlas agents from having their own independent ICC licenses, which
A.E. Ward possessed. 69 Atlas informed its agents that they "could ei-
ther 'shelve' their independent operating authority or they could
transfer it to a separate corporation which could operate under that
authority as long as the business and equipment were not associated
with Atlas."70 Based on Atlas's suggestion, Harris created a new cor-
poration to preserve A.E. Ward's independent authorities.71 The
company that Harris incorporated to operate as the Atlas agent was
named Ward Moving and Storage, Inc. ("Ward Moving"). 72 Harris
transferred the Atlas agency relationship to Ward Moving to operate
under Atlas's interstate operating authority.73 A.E. Ward retained its
own operating authorities to transport goods.74
In 1983, Atlas enacted a new policy stating that the name of the
corporation not acting as the agent for Atlas could not be "similar to
or otherwise identifiable with the name of the Atlas agent. "'h This
meant that A.E. Ward, the company no longer acting as the agent for
Atlas, could not have a similar name to the company that was acting
as Atlas's agent, Ward Moving. 76 To comply with this new Atlas pol-
icy, Harris changed the name of A.E. Ward to Allcoast Transfer, Inc.77
Allcoast succeeded to A.E. Ward's independent authorities to trans-
port goods, and Harris continued to be president and chief operating
officer of Allcoast.78
Following this corporate transformation, Union Local 392 (the
"Union") notified Harris that it considered both Allcoast and Ward
Moving to be bound by the CBA between A.E. Ward and the
Union.79 Responding to the Union, Harris stated that A.E. Ward had
changed its name to Allcoast and, therefore, only Allcoast would com-
ply with the CBA.80 Harris further contended that Ward Moving was
not bound by the CBA because it was a completely separate corpora-
tion from A.E. Ward and Allcoast.81 The Union subsequently filed an
69. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 577.
70. Id. at 577-578.
71. Id, at 578.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 578.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 578.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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unfair labor practice against both Allcoast and Ward Moving.82 After
a hearing, the administrative law judge ("AL") determined that
Allcoast and Ward Moving were alter egos of A.E. Ward, and each
was therefore bound by the CBA entered into between A.E. Ward
and the Union. 3 The Board affirmed the AL's finding; it ordered
Allcoast and Ward Moving to cease and desist from their unfair labor
practices and to compensate Ward Moving employees for losses in-
curred due to the failure to honor the CBA.8 4 The case was brought
before the Sixth Circuit by the Board, which sought enforcement of its
order. 5
In its determination of whether Allcoast and Ward Moving were the
alter egos of A.E. Ward, the Sixth Circuit began by stating that the
policy behind the alter ego doctrine is to prevent employers from
evading obligations under the NLRA merely by changing or altering
their corporate form 86 and the circumstances surrounding a change in
corporate form must be examined to determine whether the change
resulted in a "bona fide discontinuance and a true change of owner-
ship" or was merely a "disguised continuance of the old employer."87
In Allcoast, Harris agreed that the Crawford Door factors had been
met but asserted that unlawful intent on the part of the employer,
either anti-union animus or intent to evade obligations under the
NLRA, must also be found, and that such intent was not present in
this case.88 In response to Harris' assertion that unlawful intent should
be considered, the Sixth Circuit stated that, as the Supreme Court had
not previously handled the question, it was therefore not bound by
any precedent in making its decision.89 The Sixth Circuit then looked
at the approaches taken by other circuits on the issue of intent in an
alter ego analysis.90 Upon analyzing the opinions of its sister circuits,
the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a finding of employer intent is not es-
sential or prerequisite for imposition of alter ego status; instead, it is
one of the relevant factors the Board can consider along with the
Crawford Door factors. 91 The Sixth Circuit stated that, rather than
intent, the essential inquiry is "whether there was a bona fide discon-
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Ailcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 578.
85. Id. at 579.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942)).
88. Id.
89. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 579.
90. Id. at 579-581.
91. Id. at 581.
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tinuance and a true change of ownership ... or merely a disguised
continuance of the old employer." 92
In rejecting Harris's argument that the Board must find an intent to
evade union obligations before imposing alter ego status, the Sixth
Circuit stated that its rejection advancedthe purpose of the alter ego
doctrine, which is to prevent employers from evading obligations
under the NLRA by merely changing or altering their corporate
form.9 3 The Sixth Circuit further stated that if a finding of intent were
required, an employer who desires to avoid union obligations might
be tempted to circumvent the doctrine by altering the corporation's
structure based on some legitimate business reason, retaining essen-
tially the same business and utilizing the change to escape the un-
wanted obligations. 94 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that its
flexible approach would discourage such attempts at circumvention by
allowing the Board to weigh all of the relevant factors, instead of re-
quiring it to always show employer intent.95
Applying the above framework to the facts of the case, the Sixth
Circuit held that Ward Moving was the alter ego of A.E. Ward.96 The
Sixth Circuit began with the Crawford Door factors and made the fol-
lowing findings: the two enterprises had substantially identical man-
agement and supervisors, 97 the business purpose and operations of the
two were substantially identical,98 and the equipment was substan-
tially identical. 99 In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit held that "[w]hen the
circumstances so strongly support a finding of alter ego status, as they
do here, the Board can properly weigh all of the relevant factors and
infer that the employer intended to evade union obligations. 100 An
inquiry into employer intent may be appropriate in other situations
involving application of the alter ego doctrine but here it simply is not
necessary."101 Although the Sixth Circuit did not determine Harris's
intent, the court did state that the record revealed anti-union animus
92. Id. (quoting Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106).
93. Id. at 582.
94. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 582.
95. Id.
96. Id. Harris did not dispute that Allcoast was the alter ego of A.E. Ward and, therefore, the
Sixth Circuit was left only to determine if Ward Moving was the alter ego of A.E. Ward. Id.
97. Id. Harris always managed A.E. Ward, and he also managed both Ward Moving and
Allcoast. Id.
98. Id. A.E. Ward and Ward Moving operations were essentially the same; they both per-
formed moving services for Atlas. Id.
99. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 582. Ward Moving primarily obtained its equipment from
A.E. Ward and leased the original A.E. Ward trucks from Allcoast. Id.
100. Id. At 583.
101. Id.
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on the part of Harris, showing that Harris saw a change in corporate
structure as an opportunity to evade unwanted obligations under the
NLRA.102
Therefore, finding that Ward Moving satisfied the Crawford Door
factors, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Ward Moving was the alter
ego of A.E. Ward.103 Although the Sixth Circuit stated that intent
could be considered in an alter ego analysis, it did not take into ac-
count Ward Moving's intent to evade union obligations in concluding
that it was the alter ego of A.E. Ward.0" Consequently, the Sixth Cir-
cuit granted enforcement of the Board's order, requiring Allcoast and
Ward Moving to compensate Ward Moving employees for losses in-
curred due to the failure to honor the CBA and to post the appropri-
ate notice.10 5 A majority of circuits that have ruled on the issue adhere
to the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit, which is that employer
intent is only a relevant factor in an alter ego analysis.106
C. The "Foreseeable" Approach
The Fourth Circuit is the sole circuit that follows the "foreseeable"
approach.10 7 In an alter ego analysis, the Fourth Circuit begins by ask-
ing whether substantially the same entity controls both the old and
new employer.108 If this control exists, the Fourth Circuit will then
determine whether the transfer resulted in an expected or reasonably
foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of
its labor obligations.109 In 1987, the Fourth Circuit decided Alkire v.
NLRB, in which the court found that Mountaineer Hauling and Rig-
ging, Inc. ("Mountaineer") was not the alter ego of Alkire."10
In Alkire, Denzil Alkire, a sole proprietorship, operated a trucking
business hauling coal in and around West Virginia."' Prior to 1977,
approximately ninety percent of Alkire's business was hauling coal for
the Badger Coal Company, which was a union company; the other ten
percent of Alkire's business consisted of non-union hauling.112 In late
1977, a nationwide coal strike virtually shut down Alkire's hauling op-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 583.
105. Id. at 578.
106. See Gary Alan MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1045.
107. Id.
108. See NLRB v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 819 F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Alkire v.
NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983)).
109. Id.
110. See Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1016.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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erations, and he informed his employees that he was dissolving his
business for economic reasons.113 Alkire thereafter began looking for
a way to divest himself of his hauling operations.114
Two months after the strike, a former driver for Alkire formed a
company called Mountaineer.115 Alkire and Mountaineer soon en-
tered into a sale and lease agreement, in which Mountaineer acquired
the assets of Alkire's trucking business.116 However, before Mountain-
eer's loan was effective, the parties agreed that Mountaineer would
lease the vehicles and equipment from Alkire, with Alkire remaining
responsible for taxes, licenses, and loan payments.117 The sales agree-
ment also provided that, before the loan was effective, Alkire would
receive the net profits from the business, as well as a weekly consult-
ing fee.118
Upon the ending of the coal strike in early 1978, Mountaineer be-
gan hauling union coal, principally to the same customers as Alkire,
including Badger.11 9 Mountaineer hired back many of the drivers who
had worked for Alkire prior to the strike but refused to hire some of
Alkire's former employees who sought work.120 Later in the year,
Mountaineer informed Alkire that his loan had been cancelled, thus
Alkire sold his trucking business assets to another party.121
The Board filed a complaint, which listed nine individuals that Al-
kire and Mountaineer failed and refused to recall from layoff.122 The
Board found, based upon Alkire's continued involvement in the busi-
ness, that Mountaineer was the alter ego of Alkire.123 The Board then
stated that Mountaineer was under a duty to reinstate each of Alkire's
drivers who wanted to return to work, and it ordered back pay for the
individuals that Mountaineer failed to hire back.124 Alkire appealed
the Board's order to the Fourth Circuit.125
In its analysis as to whether Mountaineer was the alter ego of Al-
kire, the Fourth Circuit began by setting forth the policy underlying
the alter ego doctrine, which is to prevent an employer from gaining
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1016-17.
115. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1016.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1017.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1017.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1017.
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an unearned advantage in its labor activities simply by altering its cor-
porate form; the doctrine will treat two nominally separate business
entities as if they were a single continuous employer, when
appropriate.126
After a review of the decisions from other circuits, the Fourth Cir-
cuit determined that one emphasis in each of those cases was whether
the owners of the original business entity obtained a benefit from
transferring business operations to another entity that the original
business entity also controlled. 127 The Fourth Circuit thereafter set
forth the test to apply in an alter ego analysis.128 Initially, the Fourth
Circuit would determine whether substantially the same entity con-
trolled both the old and new employer.129 If this control existed, the
Fourth Circuit would then determine whether the transfer resulted in
an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer re-
lated to the elimination of its labor obligations.130
In support of this approach, the Fourth Circuit stated that without a
reasonably foreseeable benefit to the employer, the transfer of owner-
ship is bona fide.131 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, "[t]o the extent
that obtaining the benefit was a motive for the transfer, or was a rea-
sonably foreseeable effect, the result represents a disguised continu-
ance of the old employer." 132 Also, in explaining its reasoning for not
requiring an intent element, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, al-
though the court in Southport Petroleum indicated that a disguise in-
tended to evade the labor laws was a sufficient condition to impose
alter ego status, it did not decide whether such an intent was
necessary.133
In Alkire, the Fourth Circuit determined that no economic benefit
was obtained or reasonably expected by Alkire in the transfer, and
therefore, Mountaineer was not the alter ego of Alkire for two rea-
sons.134 First, the Fourth Circuit explained that Alkire retained no in-
terest or benefit from the continued operation of the business other
than the sale price obtained from Mountaineer.135 Second, although
the Fourth Circuit recognized that Alkire was to receive all of the net
126. Id. at 1018.
127. Id. at 1019.
128. Id. at 1020.
129. Id.
130. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1018 (citing Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942)).
134. Id. at 1021.
135. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1021.
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profit in return for renting equipment to Mountaineer prior to Moun-
taineer obtaining the loan, the Fourth Circuit found that since this
provision of the sale agreement was to protect Alkire before the loan
was effective, Alkire remained responsible for payment and, as a re-
sult, did not receive a benefit involving Alkire's labor obligations.136
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no basis
upon which one may reasonably conclude that Alkire received or ex-
pected any benefit in the transaction. 37 Consequently, finding that
Alkire's termination of the business was bona fide, the Fourth Circuit
denied enforcement of the Board's order to reinstate the union mem-
bers who had been employed by Alkire.138
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
A. The "Necessary" Approach
Under the "necessary" approach, a finding of intent to evade union
obligations is necessary in order to find the successor company the
alter ego.13 9 Courts that follow the "necessary" approach do so be-
cause of their interpretation of Southport Petroleum.140 This approach
thus seems most consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as the
Court in Southport Petroleum clearly included intent to evade in the
alter ego test.141
Despite its attempt at following Supreme Court precedent, the
"necessary" approach does not provide the best framework for an al-
ter ego analysis for two reasons. First, as the Sixth Circuit pointed out
in Allcoast, to require a finding of employer intent may enable an em-
ployer who desired to avoid union obligations to circumvent the doc-
trine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate
business reason, retaining essentially the same business and utilizing
the change to escape the unwanted obligations.142 Thus, an employer
who had not previously shown any outward anti-union sentiment
could avoid its union obligations by forming a new company and could
cite a legitimate business purpose, such as financial difficulties, as its
justification. In this instance, although the Crawford Door factors
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1022.
138. Id. at 1016.
139. See, e.g., Iowa Express Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir. 1984).
140. See, e.g., Trs. of the Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local
701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1993).
141. See Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
142. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 1986).
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would likely be met, the successor employer would not be considered
the alter ego because intent would be too difficult to prove.
Second, the circuits adhering to the "necessary" approach have
given little guidance on how intent to evade is to be determined, and
therefore, this approach fails for lack of guidance in its application.
Courts applying the "necessary" approach have determined that in-
tent to evade union responsibilities can be shown when the employer
is found to have made anti-union statements. 143 However, outside of
anti-union statements by an employer, it is unclear what other ways
intent to evade can be established. Thus, in contrast to Alkire, where
an employer could circumvent the alter ego doctrine by not making
any outward anti-union statements, an employer who has made anti-
union statements outside the context of forming a new company could
be found to be the alter ego, even though he has a legitimate business
reason for doing so and lacks an intent to evade the union.144
B. The "Important" Approach
Under the "important" approach, intent is a relevant factor to con-
sider, but a finding of anti-union motivation or intent is not necessary
in an alter ego analysis.145 Courts have articulated two reasons for
favoring the "important" approach.
First, it provides a way to prevent employers who seem to have le-
gitimate business reasons from altering their structure in order to
evade their union obligations.146 As stated in Allcoast, by applying all
of the relevant factors in an alter ego analysis, including intent, em-
ployers will not be able to avoid union obligations simply by setting
forth a valid business reason for their change in structure.147 These
circuits have concluded that the alter ego analysis should be
flexible.148
Second, the circuits that follow the "important" approach also rely
on the fact that, although anti-union motivation may be a sufficient
143. See., e.g., Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1311. "Most importantly, as the administrative law
judge noted, 'Walker had expressed an attitude toward his unionized employees from which one
could conclude that he would have gone to almost any length to achieve his objective in regard
to them."' Id.
144. See Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 581-82.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Goodman Piping Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
cases explain that the test of alter ego is flexible."); J.M. Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d
1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 1982) ("In an alter ego analysis, '[n]o factor is controlling and all need to be
present."'); NLRB v. Tricor Prods., Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980) ("There is no hard
and fast rule.")).
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basis for imposing alter ego status, Southport Petroleum did not estab-
lish that anti-union motivation is necessary.14 9
However, the "important" approach is not the best approach for
two reasons. First, the "important" approach fails to properly follow
Supreme Court precedent. Although the circuits that have adopted
the "important" approach correctly find that Southport Petroleum did
not affirmatively state whether intent was "critical" in an alter ego
analysis,15 0 they fail to adhere to the precedent of Southport Petro-
leum, which clearly states that "intent" is to be included.' 5' The rele-
vant language from Southport Petroleum is "[w]hether there was a
bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership . . . or
merely a disguised continuance of the old employer . . . ."152 The lan-
guage from Southport Petroleum therefore necessitates that intent is
not just a factor to be considered, but it must be proven in order to
find alter ego status.153
Second, by not requiring intent, an employer who altered the corpo-
rate structure for a legitimate business reason, such as financial diffi-
culties, would be found to be the alter ego if only the Crawford Door
factors were satisfied. However, satisfying the Crawford Door factors
merely determines whether the same entity controls both the old and
new employer,'154 and not whether the successor employer is a "dis-
guised" continuance.
Accordingly, the "important" approach is not the best approach be-
cause it is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent since it does not
require an intent element. 5 5 Also, by not requiring an intent element,
a successor employer can be found to be the alter ego merely by being
controlled by the same entity, which is against the purpose of the alter
ego doctrine to prevent employers from "evading obligations" under
the NLRA merely by changing or altering their corporate form. 56
Finding a successor employer to be controlled by the same entity does
not prove that the new entity was established to "evade" obligations.
149. Goodman Piping Prods., 741 F.2d at 12.
150. Id. at 10.
151. See id. at 11-12 (holding that defendant was the alter ego based upon it meeting the
Crawford Door factors.) In making only intent a factor to consider, the courts, as in Goodman
Piping, can choose not to consider intent, which flies in the face of the language from Southport
Petroleum.
152. Southport Petroleum, Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g. NLRB v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 819 F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Alkire
v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983)).
155. See, e.g., Allcoast Transfer, 780 F.2d at 581-82.
156. See id. at 579.
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C. The "Foreseeable" Approach
Under the "foreseeable" approach, courts look to see whether sub-
stantially the same entity controls both the old and new employer, and
if so, the court looks to see whether the transfer resulted in an ex-
pected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related
to the elimination of its labor obligations.' 57 The Fourth Circuit, the
lone circuit that follows the "foreseeable" approach, has set forth two
reasons in support of following this approach.
First, as with circuits following the "important" approach, the
Fourth Circuit stated that, "[a]lthough the Court in Southport Petro-
leum . . . indicated that 'a disguise intended to evade' the labor law
was a sufficient condition to impose alter ego status, . . . it did not
decide whether such an intent was necessary to that
determination. "158
Second, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]f the employer obtains no
benefit from the transfer, . . . and none was reasonably foreseeable,
nothing in labor policy justifies preventing it from arranging its affairs
as it sees fit."1 59 The Fourth Circuit based its reasoning on the obser-
vation that other circuits that have covered the alter ego doctrine all
seem to include some type of test for a foreseeable benefit to the em-
ployer, even if foreseeability is not the focus of those tests.160
However, the "foreseeable" approach is not the best approach for
two reasons. First, as with the "important" approach, it is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent, set forth in Southport Petroleum, that
employer intent to evade is included in an alter ego analysis. 161
Second, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would allow an em-
ployer to escape alter ego status if the employer had a legitimate busi-
ness reason for making a change in corporate form that also resulted
in a benefit related to eliminating labor obligations.162 By not requir-
ing an intent element, an employer with no anti-union motivation and
a valid business purpose could be determined the alter ego under the
"foreseeable" approach.
D. Proposal: The Modified "Foreseeable" Approach
This article argues that the circuits should adopt the modified "fore-
seeable" approach.
157. McAllister Bros., 819 F.2d at 444 (citing Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020).
158. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1018 (citing Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106).
159. Id. at 1021.
160. Id. at 1020-21.
161. Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106.
162. See Gary Alan MacDonald, supra note 1, at 1050.
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When business operations are transferred, the initial question is
whether the old and new employer are the same employer in fact,
given the Board's consideration of the following factors: substantially
identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, cus-
tomers, supervision, and ownership.163 If the employers are deter-
mined by the Board to be in reality the same employer, then the
inquiry must turn to whether the employer acted with an unlawful
motive or intent related to the elimination of its labor obligations.164
Intent may be shown by any of the following: 1) anti-union animus; 2)
a foreseeable benefit obtained by the employer regarding the elimina-
tion of its CBA obligations; or 3) a desire by the employer to avoid its
CBA obligations, even if the employer was motivated by other factors,
as well.
Based upon the shortcomings of the "necessary," "important," and
"foreseeable" approaches, the circuits should adopt a modified ver-
sion of the "foreseeable" approach for two reasons.
First, the modified "foreseeable" approach succeeds where the
other approaches fail. Intent may be difficult to prove where an em-
ployer, without previously displaying anti-union animus, alters the
corporate structure based on some legitimate business reason.165 By
applying a broader test, where employer motivation and intent can be
determined by more than a showing of prior anti-union animus, em-
ployers who have not previously exhibited negative behavior towards
the union can be found to be the alter ego when their intent can be
shown by the foreseeable benefit they received. Further, by requiring
more than a foreseeable benefit, the modified "foreseeable" test en-
sures that employers who change their corporate structure without an
intent to evade, and also receive a foreseeable benefit from this trans-
fer, will not be determined the alter ego.
Second, the modified "foreseeable" approach is most consistent
with Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Southport Petroleum.166
Although the circuits have correctly recognized that Southport Petro-
leum did not decide whether such intent was necessary to an alter ego
determination,167 the plain language of Southport Petroleum demands
that employer intent to evade union obligations must be included in
163. See Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020.
164. See id.
165. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
166. Although the "necessary" approach may be the best approach from the plain language of
Southport Petroleum, its overall approach fails when compared to the modified "foreseeable"
approach. See supra Part III.A.
167. See. e.g. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1018.
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an alter ego determination.16 8 By including employer motivation and
intent in the alter ego analysis, the modified "foreseeable" approach is
the best approach in determining whether a "bona fide discontinu-
ance" or a "disguised continuance" occurred.169
V. CONCLUSION
The circuits are split three ways regarding what role an employer's
motive should play in finding a successor employer to be the alter ego
of its predecessor. The First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
adopted the "necessary" approach.170 In determining whether a suc-
cessor employer is the alter ego, these circuits state that a finding of
intent to evade union obligations is necessary in an alter ego analy-
sis.171 The approach taken by the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth, District of Columbia Circuits, is the "important" approach.172
This approach states that although intent to thwart a Board order or
statutory requirement is an important criteria, a showing of employer
intent is not required in an alter ego analysis.173 The Fourth Circuit
takes the approach that, rather than intent to evade labor obligations,
the test should look to determine whether the successor employer
gained a foreseeable benefit. 174
This Article argues that courts should adopt a modified "foresee-
able" approach. This approach allows the courts to take into consid-
eration different reasons for an employer creating a new company,
and it is therefore not as restrictive as the other three approaches. In
doing so, this approach provides the best guidance to the courts when
determining whether an employer is an alter ego.
The modified "foreseeable" approach has two benefits over the
other approaches courts have taken to the issue. First, this approach
will prevent an employer from circumventing the alter ego doctrine by
altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate business
reason, and it will also protect an employer who changes its corporate
structure based on some legitimate business reason. By including that
intent may be shown by a foreseeable benefit related to the elimina-
tion of labor obligations, the proposed approach would eliminate the
ability to evade in this way. Second, by still requiring that intent be
168. See generally, Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
169. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing the test from Southport Petroleum and how it should
be interpreted).
170. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
2010]1 171
172 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 8:151
shown, this approach best adheres to the precedent set forth in South-
port Petroleum.
For these reasons, it is clear that a modified "foreseeable" approach
is the best method. This approach is the best option to ensure that
companies do not use a change in business form to evade obligations
under a CBA.
